ABSTRACT
Background: The combined impact of immunity and SARS-CoV-2 variants on viral kinetics during infections has been unclear. Methods: We characterized 1,280 infections from the National Basketball Association occupational health cohort identified between June 2020 and January 2022 using serial RT-qPCR testing. Logistic regression and semi-mechanistic viral RNA kinetics models were used to quantify the effect of age, variant, symptom status, infection history, vaccination status and antibody titer to the founder SARS-CoV-2 strain on the duration of potential infectiousness and overall viral kinetics. The frequency of viral rebounds was quantified under multiple cycle threshold (Ct) value-based definitions. Results: Among individuals detected partway through their infection, 51.0% (95% credible interval [CrI]: 48.3-53.6%) remained potentially infectious (Ct <30) 5 days post detection, with small differences across variants and vaccination status. Only seven viral rebounds (0.7%; N=999) were observed, with rebound defined as 3+days with Ct <30 following an initial clearance of 3+days with Ct ≥30. High antibody titers against the founder SARS-CoV-2 strain predicted lower peak viral loads and shorter durations of infection. Among Omicron BA.1 infections, boosted individuals had lower pre-booster antibody titers and longer clearance times than non-boosted individuals. Conclusions: SARS-CoV-2 viral kinetics are partly determined by immunity and variant but dominated by individual-level variation. Since booster vaccination protects against infection, longer clearance times for BA.1-infected, boosted individuals may reflect a less effective immune response, more common in older individuals, that increases infection risk and reduces viral RNA clearance rate. The shifting landscape of viral kinetics underscores the need for continued monitoring to optimize isolation policies and to contextualize the health impacts of therapeutics and vaccines. Funding: Supported in part by CDC contract #200-2016-91779, a sponsored research agreement to Yale University from the National Basketball Association contract #21-003529, and the National Basketball Players Association.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Dermatitis , Humans , Aged , SARS-CoV-2/genetics , RNA, Viral , Retrospective Studies , COVID-19/epidemiology , Antibodies, ViralABSTRACT
With the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants that may increase transmissibility and/or cause escape from immune responses, there is an urgent need for the targeted surveillance of circulating lineages. It was found that the B.1.1.7 (also 501Y.V1) variant, first detected in the United Kingdom, could be serendipitously detected by the Thermo Fisher TaqPath COVID-19 PCR assay because a key deletion in these viruses, spike Δ69-70, would cause a "spike gene target failure" (SGTF) result. However, a SGTF result is not definitive for B.1.1.7, and this assay cannot detect other variants of concern (VOC) that lack spike Δ69-70, such as B.1.351 (also 501Y.V2), detected in South Africa, and P.1 (also 501Y.V3), recently detected in Brazil. We identified a deletion in the ORF1a gene (ORF1a Δ3675-3677) in all 3 variants, which has not yet been widely detected in other SARS-CoV-2 lineages. Using ORF1a Δ3675-3677 as the primary target and spike Δ69-70 to differentiate, we designed and validated an open-source PCR assay to detect SARS-CoV-2 VOC. Our assay can be rapidly deployed in laboratories around the world to enhance surveillance for the local emergence and spread of B.1.1.7, B.1.351, and P.1.
Subject(s)
COVID-19/virology , SARS-CoV-2/genetics , COVID-19/diagnosis , COVID-19/genetics , DNA Primers , Humans , Multiplex Polymerase Chain Reaction/methods , Mutation , Polyproteins/genetics , Viral Proteins/geneticsABSTRACT
The emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7, first detected in the United Kingdom, has become a global public health concern because of its increased transmissibility. Over 2,500 COVID-19 cases associated with this variant have been detected in the United States (US) since December 2020, but the extent of establishment is relatively unknown. Using travel, genomic, and diagnostic data, we highlight that the primary ports of entry for B.1.1.7 in the US were in New York, California, and Florida. Furthermore, we found evidence for many independent B.1.1.7 establishments starting in early December 2020, followed by interstate spread by the end of the month. Finally, we project that B.1.1.7 will be the dominant lineage in many states by mid- to late March. Thus, genomic surveillance for B.1.1.7 and other variants urgently needs to be enhanced to better inform the public health response.